



Peru and Other Matters
In the issue of The International Lawyer for July, 1970, George Jackson
Eder commented on the recent rash of expropriations and nationalizations
in Latin America.' The article is replete with practical and valuable obser-
vations, and includes, as befits a piece by a veteran Latin-American hand
of broad experience at the highest levels, a number of authoritative anec-
dotes and examples. The concluding summary, on the role of lawyers in
these matters, should be required reading for all lawyers and corporate
executives with interests in Latin America.
However, this writer found it disquieting that what appear to him to be
frequent and substantial factual inaccuracies marked Mr. Eder's article, at
least in those instances when he was dealing with matters within the
present writer's own interest and research. It was further disquieting to
find, on ennumerating the apparent errors in systematic fashion, that almost
all of them would probably feed an attitude of righteous indignation on the
part of United States interests; i.e., they would unfairly be induced into
believing that their interests and the interests of others like them had been
denied by means of arbitrary, capricious, illegal and unjust actions of the
foreign governments in question. Considering the source of these errors,
and the authority which his reputation unquestionably commands, this is an
unfortunate circumstance.
In the interests of keeping the record in good order, this author offers to
the same readership reached by Mr. Eder's article, some corrections based
on his own independent research touching on some of the same matters
with which he dealt.
*B.A., Grinnell College, 1962; J.D., Iowa, 1965. Associate Professor of Law, Arzonia
State University; formerly Sub-Director and Visiting Professor, Chile Law Program of the
International Legal Center.
'Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAWYER 611 (1970). For
Mr. Eder's response to this reply see p. 354, infra.
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IPC and Peru
Mr. Eder implies that the Peruvian government evaluated its total debt
to International Petroleum Company (presumably for the expropriation of
the Talara refinery and other industrial installations on the La Brea y
Parifias property, plus the petroleum exploitation rights in the neighboring
"Lima" concession, plus the wholesale and retail marketing network for
ESSO-brand products in Peru) at approximately $71 million, when the
company's holdings were really worth approximately $190 million.2
In fact, the decree-law fixing the $71-million figure makes it clear that it
represents the value only of the "Talara industrial complex," viz., those
IPC installations which physically form a part of the disputed La Brea y
Parifias property.3 The Peruvian government has recognized that IPC's
total holdings were worth closer to the figure which Mr. Eder cites;4 in no
instance has Peru claimed it owed only $71 million for the IPC properties
it expropriated throughout Peru.
Consistent with the misconception noted above, Mr. Eder states in his
article that the Revolutionary Government moved immediately to take all
of IPC's holdings, "whether in dispute or not," throughout Peru. 5 In fact,
only the La Brea y Parifias field and installations were taken in the first
instance.6 IPC's other properties went under government embargo three
and a half months later, 7 and were finally expropriated some ten months
after La Brea y Parifias. 8
Addressing an issue that goes to the heart of the IPC controversy in
Peru, Mr. Eder unqualifiedly contends that the company's ownership of the
mineral rights in La Brea y Parifias "was expressly confirmed by arbitral
judgment handed down by an international tribunal in 1922 under a treaty
between Peru and Great Britain."9 In fact, insofar as this may imply a
studied decision by an international court on the basis of its careful in-
dependent consideration of the relevant law and facts, it is misleading, for
the tribunal in question merely adopted an agreement by the purported
21d., at 619.
3Decree-Law (hereafter D. L.) No. 17517 of March 21, 1969. For a definition of the
Talara industrial complex see the preamble to D. L. No. 17066 of Oct. 9, 1968.
The IPC has never confused the property being valued. See IPC's three-volume collec-
tion of documents and commentary, THE LA BREA Y PARIiFAS CONTROVERSY, especially
volume III at 5, 8, 21-22 (1969) (hereafter CONTROVERSY).
41PC indicates the official value in addition to the $71 million was $62 million, making a
total of over $133 million. See III CONTROVERSY at 8.
5Eder, op. cit. supra, at 620.
6D.L. No. 17066, supra, note 3.7Supreme Decree (hereafter S.D.) No. 014-EM/DGH of Aug. 22, 1969.
8See Notice to the Manager of JPC, Jan. 28, 1969, in II CONTROVERSY, Exhibit 78.
9 Eder, op. cit., supra, at 619.
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agents of the two countries, of questionable validity, which may have
dodged the issue of ownership. 10 In the same vein, the article in question
refers to IPC's 1968 agreement "to give up its lands, mineral rights and
producing facilities."'" In fact, it was IPC's alleged mineral rights which
were the issue; it gave up its claim to such rights, not a clear an unencum-
bered title.
Mr. Eder's article refers to a "purge" of the Peruvian judiciary following
the summary dismissal of the "legally-constituted" Supreme Court and the
naming of sixteen new justices to replace those taken off that court.12 In
fact, the action of the Revolutionary Government was primarily for the
purpose of improving a judiciary generally recognized for its incompetence
and corruption, and a judicial system generally known for its inefficiency
and delay.' 3 The recent new appointments to the Supreme Court were
most notable for their uniformly proven high level of competence, achieve-
ment and - yes - even independence of thought and action.
It is true that the President of the Supreme Court, prior to its "reorgani-
zation," was an exceptionally capable jurist who was probably removed for
his marital ties to the family of the deposed President Beladnde and for his
outspoken public statements concerning the illegality of de facto govern-
ment; but, overall, there has been an improvement in the Peruvian
judiciary since the Revolutionary Government's action, and the Supreme
Court has proved to be far from a rubber stamp for the de facto govern-
ment's actions.' 4 IPC's options before the Peruvian bench and adminis-
trative agencies were far more varied than Mr. Eder indicates, and, in fact,
the company did carry out numerous appeals on several levels and several
legal theories.' 5
W. R. Grace and Peru
Mr. Eder notes that two foreign firms with extensive, highly-efficient
coastal sugar plantations and processing plants -W. R. Grace & Co. and
Gildemeister-lost their entire holdings to the Agrarian Reform as carried
out by the Revolutionary Government. Mr. Eder properly points out that
10 See analysis in Furnish, Domestic Law Aspects of the La Brea y Parinas Controversy
in Peru, Kv. L.J. 1971.
"
1Eder, op. cit. supra, at 620.121d.
'
3 See preamble to D.L. No. 18060 of Dec. 23, 1969.
'
4The government's so-called Freedom-of-the-Press Law, D.L. No. 18075 of Dec. 30,
1969, to which Mr. Eder also refers, was upheld by one vote in a split decision. First Sala of
the Peruvian Supreme Court of June 30, 1970 (3-2-1 vote). Now the court is apparently
deadlocked over the constitutionality of the Revolutionary Government's actions under the
Agrarian Reform Law in another case, brought by the Tucumfn hacienda.15See all three volumes of CONTROVERSY and the exhibits; Furnish, op. cit. supra, note
10
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not only the foreign interests, but also those of the Peruvian sugar plan-
tation-owners- including some of the most powerful landed families in the
country -were expropriated in the name of Agrarian Reform. 16
The reason for the junta's action is well known and is almost totally
unrelated to the question of ownership to the land in question: the farm
workers on the coastal sugar haciendas are highly organized, and had been
faithful supporters of APRA, the political party which has a traditional
blood-feud with the Peruvian military, and which stood to win the elections
of 1969 had they been held-thus the party which lost the most with the
advent of military government. By taking over the administration of the
coastal haciendas, the military transferred the loyalty of their working force
from APRA to the Revolutionary Government.
It is doubtful whether any extraneous influences could have saved W. R.
Grace's sugar lands, or those of anyone else caught in the cross-fire of so
important an engagement in Peruvian politics. The military wished to crush
APRA's seat of power and did so; W. R. Grace, Gildemeister, and the
other landholders were standing directly in the line of fire and were coinci-
dental- if not unpopular- victims of the Revolutionary Governments' ma-
jor aim.
Mr. Eder's expressed opinions concerning the Agrarian Reform in gen-
eral, and as specifically applied to W.R. Grace & Co.,' 7 demonstrate the
sort of attitude which leads to the unpopularity of foreign interests in Latin
America: the idea that if a program to bring about social change touches
United States investments, it is tinged with communism, ill-conceived, and
arbitrarily administered.
Implying that the Peruvian Agrarian Reform is under the sway of com-
munist advisers, Mr. Eder seems to ignore the fact that most of the
institutions and mechanisms of the Agrarian Reform Law18 are consistent
with those of other programs throughout Latin America.
Agrarian reform is an irresistible force in Latin America, and is now
being carried out under carefully-drafted comprehensive laws drawn in the
light of more than a decade of experience with the problem in several
countries. It ill serves United States business interests in Latin America to
view the phenomenon, which is the result of powerful social and economic
stresses within the complex context of Latin American society, as the
arbitrary and capricious work of crackpot dictators or left-wing regimes.
The "manager of a Colombian sugar mill"19 who had visited Peru after
16Eder, op. cit. supra, 622.
"7Id., 622-23.1 8D.L. No. 17716 of June 24, 1969. This law was recently designated a model for Latin
American agrarian reform by an FAO convention in Caracas.
19Eder, op. cit. supra, 623 n. 23.
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the sugar-plantation seizures notwithstanding, the action against the own-
ers of a company who withdrew funds from a New York bank was fitting,
proper, and consistent under the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law. 20
Mr. Eder's question as to "what kind of land-distribution pro-
gram ... not only seizes a farmer's land, but confiscates his livestock,
growing crops, installations and equipment and even his money in the
bank?" 21 is probably prejudicial in its implication of arbitrary seizure
without compensation, 22 but even more, would probably elicit the following
answer from anyone generally familiar with the course of agrarian reform
in Latin America over the past ten years: Virtually every "land-distribution
program" now operative in Latin America does these things to something
near the same extent that Peru does. One might well contrast Mr. Eder's
comments with those of W. R. Grace's representatives (at least in public)
in Peru following the loss of its sugar lands. Significantly, W. R. Grace,
consistent with the Agrarian Reform law, kept its secondary processing
installations reliant on the sugar property for raw materials.
Hickenlooper and Peru
The Hickenlooper Amendment had an effect in Peru from 1963 to 1968,
in the form of reduced aid to the country pending a satisfactory resolution
of the La Brea y Parifias question, and may well have the factor which
prevented an earlier nationalization of the property. 23 Unfortunately, the
period of reduced aid coincided with the administration of a progressive,
visionary and scrupulously constitutional president, Fernando Belatinde
Terry. The United States policy hampered Belatinde's political stock by
freezing a high-priority issue into an impasse, while popular concern and
discontent continued to build, at the same time it withheld funds which
otherwise might have allowed him to achieve more in his domestic pro-
grams.
After the semi-freeze had been applied for five years, there were Pe-
ruvians who had learned the lesson that United States aid was not entirely
necessary (there are other sources of funds and technical assistance) and/or
the political price for it, detrimental, or at least oblivious, to the social and
economic and political needs of Peru, was too high. Hickenlooper's amend-
2 0D.L. No. 17716 of June 24, 1969, arts. 37, 61; D.L. No. 17719 of July 1i, 1969; D.L.
No. 17808 of Aug., 1969.2 1Eder, op. cit. supra, 623.221n fact, the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law provides for the payment of cash for
expropriated livestock and installations. D.L. No. 17716 of June 24, 1969, arts. 178- 179.
Owners may also harvest crops planted before expropriation becomes final. D.L. No. 17719
of July 11, 1969, art. 5.
23See Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," New Yorker, (May 17, 1969), p. 41.
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ment is like a gun with only one round in it against a crowd: no good when
you have to use it.
And in Latin America today, in what concerns instances of foreign
investment popularly regarded as wrongs, old and deep, the crowd will not
be bluffed.
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REPLY
The Editor-in-Chief of The International Lawyer, has very kindly given
me the opportunity of replying to Professor Furnish's criticism of my
article on "Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter," in the July issue
of that publication.
It has generally seemed to me unfair to give the author of an article two
cracks at a subject while his critics are given only one. I shall therefore
refrain from refuting, point by point, what appear to me to be fallacies in
Professor Furnish's criticism. I trust that readers who might be inclined to
concede some merit to the professor's comments will read the original
article and then conclude that, nit-picking aside, my article is factually
sound, and that the sole basis for criticism is a divergence of opinion and
point of observation.
It is my assumption that the professor has never been threatened by
expropriation without compensation and can view the subject from an
ivory tower of academic isolation, as distant from him as the murder of one
African tribe by another, or the extermination of the Russian kulaks. My
clients and 1, to the contrary, have been on the spot in more ways than one.
It is my sincere belief that the taking of property without compensation
is robbery, and I disapprove of it. Professor Furnish takes a contrary view
and, with reference to agrarian "reform," sees it as "an irresistible force in
Latin America," which presumably makes it right. I disagree, if "reform"
means confiscation.
While I have for years advocated reforms in Latin American land tenure
and agricultural goals and practices, International Competition in the
Trade of Argentina, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931,
pp. 140- 145; "How a Sound Land Program Can Raise Living Standards in
Latin America," D.S. Inter-American Council, 1960; I have not hesitated
to castigate the confiscation of private property, whether by politicians for
their own ends or under the guise of social reform, as in Mexico, Brazil,
Bolivia, and elsewhere, "Urban Concentration, Agriculture, and Agrarian
Reform," The Annals, American Society of Political and Social Science,
July 1965, pp. 27-47; Inflation and Development in Latin America, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1968, pp. 63, 71-78.
GEORGE JACKSON EDER
November 22, 1970
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